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PREFACE
This thesis consists of two separate essays. The first essay is titled "Bargaining
Power in the BeefIndustry." This essay seeks to determine how bargaining power shifts
between feedlots and processing plants under changing market conditions. A simulated
fed cattle market was used to evaluate fed cattle transactions that took place under
changing supply and demand conditions. Analysis of this information allowed for the
creation of a bargaining power index and statistical modeling. This process identified
which side (feedlots or processors) maintained thl: majority of bargaining power under
continuously changing market conditions. Primary contributions of this essay are
isolating the changing nature of bargaining power in the beef industry, which has not
been completed to this extent in previous research. Also, the experimental de ign of this
study potentially has benefits to further study in the areas of price discovery and price
determination. The data analyzed in this essay were generated by students of the
Agricultural Economics Course 3990 at Oklahoma State University. The experimental
design included three one semester sets of transaction specific and supply and demand
information.
The second essay, titled "Contracting in the Beef Industry" seeks to determine the
effects of increasing levels of contracting between feedlot producers and beef packers on
cash transaction prices. The primary focus of this essay is to identify trends in cash price
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receipts that occur as levels of contracting increase. A second issue identifies volatility
characteristics that are associated with high levels of contracting. Simulated fed cattle
transaction information allowed for regression and statistical analysis which concluded
this research. Data for this study were generated from a one semester controlled study in
the Agricultural Economics Course 3990. Systematic levels of contracting were
implemented in order to evaluate the effects on cash price. This information was then
compared to three previous semesters in which mandatory contracting was not involved.
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ESSAY ONE
BARGAINING POWER IN THE BEEF INDUSTRY
BARGAINING POWER IN THE BEEF INDUSTRY
Abstract
This research deals with bargaining power, which is the ability of one entity
involved in a transaction to receive more favorable tenns than the other. Specifically, the
bargaining power studied in this essay focuses on products that have a specified life span.
In other words, the product must be sold within a certain window of time before it
expires, spoils, or becomes outdated. The subject of study in this research is the
transaction process that occurs between feedlots and meat processors in the beef industry.
Animals involved in this process have a specified timeframe in which they can be most
easily sold for a favorable price, after which they are sold at a considerable discount.
This study examines the factors that influence bargaining power and then identifies which
entity (packers or feeders) maintain the majority of bargaining power under changing
supply and demand situations.
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BARGAINING POWER IN THE BEEF INDUSTRY
Introduction
Bargaining takes place in every sector of the economy. For example. consumers
bargain with auto dealers to obtain a reasonable price for automobiles. The same is true
for the agricultural sector. Producers bargain for prices when selling goods and animals.
Thus, bargaining is extremely important because it allows both parties to participate in
establishing the terms of trade for a particular product or service.
Because bargaining is continuously used in business for creating trade
agreements, it has important business and economic effects. However. studies in the area
have typically focused on labor or business negotiations. These studies usually are not
replicable and do not have controlled observations because they are typically done in case
study format (Datt 1996; Monye 1996).
The focus in this study is on negotiation that takes place between the cattle
feeding and meat packing segments of the beef industry. The negotiation and bargaining
process is carried out between feedlots and packing companies. Producers seek to
produce and market animals that will earn the highest possible amount of profit while
processors seek to purchase cattle at low prices to earn strong profits. Thus. the
producer/processor marketplace is continuously in negotiation. These negotiations are
affected by overall supply and demand forces along with the characteristics of speci fic
lots of cattle.
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In this analysis, bargaining power will be studied through the use of experimental
simulation. The objective of the study is to determine the different economic factors that
affect bargaining power. The study will be conducted with the aid of the Fed Cattle
Market Simulator (FCMS) developed at Oklahoma State University, which is a model
used to simulate market dynamics in the meat packing industry. Representatives for both
packers and feeders negotiate terms and prices in which animals will be sold. The
importance of such an activity is that it gives an industry-like result through organized
trade and bargaining. Players of the game have the responsibility of calculating the break
even selling or buying price they must have in order to realize success in a trade
agreement.
Conceptual Framework
Bargaining is the process of suppliers and processors working dir ctly with one
another to agree on a specific price for which a commodity will be traded. The
bargaining process is important because through it the terms of trade for a product are
established. Many factors affect bargaining power, including overall market demand and
supply conditions as well as the quality of specific products. For example, if increased
demand for a certain product occurs, it is common for producers to be able to negotiate
higher prices and receive increased returns. Similarly, a sale lot of cattle or other
products with superior or premium quality will typically receive higher prices than
average quality. This bargaining power exists in the context of markets creating a supply
and demand equilibrium.
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In order to reach market equilibriwn processors and producers typically negotiate
to buy and sell products in terms of price and quality. Throughout the course of
bargaining, which typically involves buying, selling, haggling, negotiation, and
compromise, suppliers and processors reach an agreement on terms in which products
will be exchanged (Ladd 1964). In many cases there are factors that cause one party to
receive a "better deal than the other." In other words, one side will receive more profit
from the transaction. Therefore, it could be said that the side that received more profit
has the greatest amount of bargaining power.
As an example of the practical effect of bargaining power, consider trade in the
horticulture industry. Within the industry there are producers that plant, package, or
germinate seeds, as well as processors that grow or prepare floral arrangements. It is the
producers' task to identify how many seeds to prepare based on seasonal demand
conditions. Similarly, since each processor generally will not buy on~ producer's entire
production, producers also must be prepared to make purchase decisions based on
consumer demand. They should also consider how many plants of each type to grow and
prepare based on factors including size, color preference, and longevity of the plant.
In general, producers and retailers are faced with the task of negotiating what
price to buy and sell the items. Producers want to sell the items at the highest possible
price in order to realize maximum profit, while the processors want to pay the lowest
price possible in order to ultimately realize their greatest potential profit. Both sides
know the range of prices and terms for which they are willing to trade. Producers want to
make at least enough from their sales to cover their costs of production. However,
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processors do not want to pay more than what they will be able to sell the finished
product for, after accounting for transportation, labor, and any other expenses.
The situation when both producers and processors make a profit is likely the
typical situation because neither party could sustain losses indefinitely. but for short
periods they may operate at a loss. Many times one side or the other is forced into s lling
their product at a loss. This is especially prevalent or possible when the products being
sold are perishable or have a finite life-span. Many times sellers incur a loss in order to
avoid further losses later in the life of the product. Such a situation develops in the
fashion industry. For example, retailers optimally want to sell their apparel at the highest
price the market will allow, as is common when a new design enters the market.
However, as fashions change, so do preferences of the consumers and sales at discounted
prices occur. Instead of keeping clothing until it is extremely hard (if not impossible) to
sell, retailers will sell clothing for less than opportune prices in order to avoid a complete
loss in the long-run.
Although generally not directly observable, bargaining can be measured in order
to show which side involved in a transaction is most able to receive favorable terms of
trade. In addition, in order to analyze bargaining power, it is necessary to decide what
factors affect it. These factors can be expected to include market conditions, such as
supply and demand, and transaction specific factors, which are specific to the product
that is under question. Transaction specific factors describe the character of the good,
such as quality, size, appearance, or age.
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Considering that bargaining power can be influenced by overall market conditions
and quality characteristics of specific lots ofcattle, one reasonable way to conceptualize
the relationship is in the following equation:
(1) BP=f(X,Z)
where. BP = bargaining power, X = supply and demand conditions and Z = transaction
specific conditions.
The supply and demand variables (X) represent the amount desired and supplied
of a certain type of product that is available for sale. The transaction specific variables
(Z) represent the specific quality of cattle actually traded at a certain time. Both sets of
variables together represent the key factors that affect bargaining power.
The focus of this study is the fed cattle market which consists of feedlots and
packers. Feedlots who are suppliers, want to sell cattle to packers at a high enough price
to cover their costs and make a profit in the long-run. Packers transform the live animals
into various cuts of meat and market that product to retailers and other customers.
Packers also want to cover their costs and make a reasonable profit in the long-run.
In the cattle market to be studied, a number of factors affect bargaining power, as
is similar to other industries. A key factor is the particular demand and supply condition
(Trapp et a1. 1994). In addition to supply and demand, feedlots and processors
commonly reference overall market infonnation about industry conditions (Anderson et
a1. 1998).
During the negotiation of sales, both feeders and packers pay special attention to
items such as weight and showlist size, which is the number of animals projected to enter
feedlots. As the number of cattle entering feedlots increases, supply increases. If supply
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increases outweigh demand increases, a surplus develops. As such a surplus develops,
prices paid for animals can be expected to decline. Therefore, packers would have strong
bargaining power during this time period. However, during times of short supply, often
when the showlist is small, a relative shortage can develop. When there is such an
occurrence, packers usually are willing to pay higher prices in order to obtain the animals
and cover at least some of their fixed costs. As the showlist or number of cattle available
for sale increases. bargaining power for packers will increase and the price per pound can
be expected to decrease.
Cattle placed in feedlots are sorted into feeding pens based on their weight.
Feedlot managers monitor each pen of cattle's intake and growth on a regular basis. The
cattle are targeted for sale at a weight where they will grade choice. However, once cattle
exceed that weight they may receive quality grade discounts due to unfavorable weight
characteristics that result from an extended feeding period.
It is hypothesized that cattle have a maximum value in the FCMS at the weight of
1150 pounds because marbling characteristics and muscle size matches those demanded
by consumers once the meat has been converted into retail cuts (Trapp et al. 1994). The
weight of slaughter animals is closely related to the price of boxed beef that is sold to
retail grocers. Processors ideally want to buy animals at a certain weight in order to
minimize the input that goes into preparing the meat for retail sale. Additional labor is
required to trim excess fat or size from steaks when animals are too large in order to
make the product pleasing to the consumer. The price will ultimately be higher at the
retail end in order to cover the costs of the additional labor, which can cause a reduction
in sales. Small animals. as well as larger ones, often cause losses to producers because
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the meat suffers yield grade diSCOWlts in retail stores (Ward et al. 1999b). Processors
therefore seek to purchase animals at ideal weights, which should theoretically give
additional bargaining power strength to feedlots during such time periods. Thus, weight
likely has the most dramatic affect on the value of animals as they leave the feed yard.
Although the price-weight relationship is an extremely crucial function of the market,
little study has been reported in the context of bargaining power.
Empirical Model
In order to study the effect of various factors on bargaining power, it is necessary
to develop an empirical counterpart to the bargaining power concept described in
Equation 1 above. Empirically studying bargaining power in a large scale study with
controlled observations per se is a relatively new area; however there are several related
research efforts on which to draw. These efforts include price discovery (Ward et al.
1996) and hedonic price analysis (Bowman and Ethridge 1992; Epple 1987~ Rosen 1974~
Lyford et a1. 1997).
In order to operationalize the bargaining power concept, a specific measure of
bargaining power needs to be developed. Such an index needs to take into account and
measure market changes that are caused by a change in conditions. An index previously
used by Trapp et a1. was fonned from the average slaughter price for a particular period.
This price was then used to detennine a percentage of profits captured by feedlots.
Accordingly, the percentage was then multiplied by 100 to fonn an index (Trapp et al.
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1994). This index provides. an adequate representation tor bargaining power and could
be used in this study. Therefore, one choice for the bargaining power index (BPI) is:
(2)
where
BPI = P I [(BEp + BEr)/2],
BPI = bargaining power index,
P = price paid per animal,
BEp = break even price for packers.
BEf = break even price for feedlots.
A second choice is to fonn an index that measures the amount of potential profit
available, rather than forming a ratio of potential profit. The second choice for a
bargaining power index is:
(3)
whae
BPI = P - [(BEp + BEr) /2],
P = price received per trade,
BEp = breakeven price for packers,
BE f = breakeven price for feedlots.
After further study of the two index structures, it was determined that either form
is suitable for the calculations of the index. However. the second form is more easily
explained because it is simply a difference between price paid and breakeven for packers
and feedlots. Ultimately, it was chosen because it lends itself to more understandable
interpretations.
For the beef industry, market conditions are hypothesized to impact or explain
bargaining power. In order to test the effects of each variable, a statistical model has been




where BPIit =bargaining power index, elit = intercept, P=parameters to be estimated. Xil
= vector of market variables, and E it = error tenn. Additionally, it was originally
hypothesized that boxed beef price as well as total pens sold would have a significant
affect on bargaining power. However, further study described below revealed other
suggestions.
Supply and demand is a dominating feature that affects bargaining power. Supply
and demand possibly has more of a detenninistic role in the beef packing segment of the
cattle market than in other industries. This is attributed to the fact that processors are
generally quick in adjusting to changing conditions while feedlots often experience
production lags attributed to the time it takes to make an animal available for sale. Ward
et a1. (1996) identifies several supply and demand variables that have previously been
used to predict market conditions. Among these variables are futures price. yield grade,
number of head sold, boxed beef cutout value, and forward contracting volume.
Although some variables are not applicable to this research. certain ones described below
are.
The noted supply and demand agents that influence bargaining power are showlist
size. boxed beef price and total pens sold. Each variable affects the supply and demand
situation, which in tum directly affects bargaining power. Showlist size is a good
measure of overall supply because it is the variable that describes the number of animals
available for sale in a given week. Consequently, this has a major impact on the ability
of animals within a given weight class to be sold. Boxed beef price is hypothesized to be
a necessary component because it yields detailed infonnation needed to establish the
price retail cuts of meat are sold for by processors. This can act as a bargaining tool by
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feedlots. Feedlots often feel that they should realize above average profits from
processors when the price of boxed beef is high. Equally important is the number of pens
that are being sold in a given period. Under conditions when unusually high numbers of
animals are being sold to processors, feedlots realize that demand conditions are high.
Thus, there is commonly a possibility for increased feedlot profit. Feedlots commonly
monitor situations such as this to determine when they can bargain their cattle most
successfully.
After study of the subject, it was realized that not all of the variables previously
described could function fluently in the same model. Specifically, the impacts of boxed
beef were captured through the use of the index described above because boxed beef
price is used in the calculation of packer breakeven prices. Therefore, boxed beef price
was not deemed necessary for the bargaining power equation. Additionally, the total
number of pens sold was found to be highly correlated to the showlist variable described
above. Therefore, it was not necessary to use a total pens sold variable because the
showlist size quite adequately explains more of the overall supply/demand dynamics of
the market.
The showlist variable was proven to be vital to the estimation of bargaining power
and therefore chosen to represent supply characteristics. The flexible nature of the
variable, as well as its broad explanatory power, led to this choice. Within the dynamics
of the FCMS, earlier research has shown that as showlist size changes, so does the price
of the animals being sold. Cattle prices are typically high when the showlist is low;
likewise, as showlist increases the price received for animals declines. Accordingly, it is
logical to deduce that showlist and price are inversely related. Therefore, it is
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hypothesized that bargaining power is greater for feedlots when showlists are low and
lower when showlists are high.
The use of a showlist squared term confirmed the strength possessed by the
showlist variable. The showlist squared variable shows that as showlist gets larger there
is a diminishing marginal impact on the bargaining power retained by feedlots. As the
number of animals available for sale increases, bargaining power is reduced at a
decreasing rate for feedlots. Theoretically, each additional animal does not reduce
bargaining power as much as the one before it.
Quality characteristics have a major contribution to bargaining power as
indicated by the conceptual model. Perhaps the most influential quality characteristic (at
least in this structure) is weight because it encompasses all other quality characteristics
such as yield grade, quality grade, and dressing percentage. As animals increase in
weight from 1125 pounds, it is hypothesized that they gain bargaining power for feedlots
to a certain extent, under normal market conditions. However. if the animals become too
heavy, it is also likely that those animals will begin to lose bargaining power under the
same conditions until a certain point when the cattle do not meet the specifications of the
market and are forced to be sold at a discount. This occurs in the FCMS when animals
reach weights above 1200 pounds. At this time they are sold at a considerable loss within
the computer simulator. It is hypothesized that an animal's bargaining power increases
until it reaches a weight around 1150 pounds and then declines significantly thereafter
In addition, it is theorized that animals have more bargaining power before they reach
1150 pounds, but they typically sen for more at that weight. The hypothesized impact of
each variable is presented in Table). In compliance with the hypothesis that bargaining
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power declines significantly after the weight of 1150 poWlds, it was recognized that the
price per pOWld of beef declines as the animal exceeds 1150 pounds. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that under normal conditions an animal weighing 1150 pounds will be more
easily sold and with better bargaining power to the seller than an animal weighing 1200
pounds.
As previously described, it is believed that the showlist size plays an important
role in the determination of bargaining power. Therefore, there is a need to isolate the
outcome of bargaining power as showlist changes at each weight level. Through doing
this, changes in bargaining power can be monitored as supply conditions vary between
heavy and light. In order to accomplish this, an interaction term between showlist and
weight will be created. It is further hypothesized that feedlots control even greater
bargaining power at all weights when relatively few cattle are available for trade.
Alternatively, it is also believed that feedlots have little bargaining power at all weights
when the market is saturated with animals to be traded.
Data were derived from three separate years of the FCMS. Each year consists of
individual traits that are specific to the particular semester in which each data set was
recorded. In order to maintain quality test results, it is necessary to include a variable that
is representative of those specific years of transactions. This variable will identify
individual years as well as test for consistency in both the transaction specific and supply
and demand relationships in each data set.
In summary. the model can be described by the empirical equation to be tested:
(5) SPlit = a + Xit + lit + Shwl + Shwl2 + Yit + E it.
1.+
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where BPI = bargaining power index, a = intercept value for 1150 pound cattle, X = a
vector of the variable indicating weight of the cattle, Z =a vector of showlist and weight
interaction conditions, Shwl = showlist, Y = the year in which the trade occurred, and the
subscripts i and t refer to specific lots and time periods in which a transaction occurred,
respectively.
Experimental Economics
Experimental economics is a form of modeling designed to simulate the actual
functions of economic activity. Edward Chamberlin, who designed a market simulation
to explain cost structure and contract pricing, first reported experimental economics in
1948 (Davis and Holt 1993). Davis and Holt also note that experimental economics was
later broadened to game experiments in the 1950's and 1960's. The purpose of the studies
was to monitor participant reasoning, decision making, and negotiation in a controlled
environment.
Since the introduction of experimental economics, criteria and standards have
evolved for using valid testing approaches. Among these factors are replicability,
motivation and an unbiased environment. These criteria are important to testing in order
to authenticate the results obtained. The studies must be able to be replicated in order to
ensure validity of the results. In addition, participants must be motivated in some way so
as to fulfill their task as well as possible; this ensures market-like results. Participants
should react to the events within the experimental environment as if they were happening
in the market place. Further, individual participants should not benefit from insider
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infonnation gained from the administrators of the experiment unless this is explicitly part
of the research design. The goal is to create and study real world market dynamics in a
controlled setting.
Experimental economics and experimental simulation (another fonn of
experimental study), although closely related, can be distinguished. Experimental
economics evolves when the researcher actively controls specific variables within the
system, in order to monitor and record the effects of the control on economic behavior
and perfonnance. Experimental simulation designs function more freely than
experimental economics by allowing participants to make virtually all decisions
themselves with no restraints. Experimental simulation is designed to capture the
relationships that exist between economic variables of a specific market when major
components of that market are affected by realistic market changes (Ward et a1. 1996).
Thus, since few variables are controlled, the result is a market simulation that functions
much like a real-world market. Accordingly, the FCMS adheres to the experimental
simulation guidelines.
The FCMS is a form of experimental simulation that is designed to represent the
market activities that take place between feedlots and packers. Through observation of
cattle transactions it is possible to recognize and study market characteristics, negotiation
patterns, and ultimately, bargaining power.
The FCMS was developed to focus on the trades that occur between feedlots and
packers. Therefore, participants can experience the diversity and dynamics that are
involved with numerous repetitions of market trading periods.
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Experimental elements within the FCMS parallel both experimental simulation
and experimental economics (Dowty 1996). The simulator exhibits a structure that
parallels components of a microeconomic system specified by Smith (1982) for
experimental economics. This is accomplished through the use of a specified market
structure and subjects or participants that make decisions that affect performance of both
their own firm and the entire market.
Friedman and Sunder (1994) note that research designs in experimental
economics should control specific variables that allow researchers to focus on a specific
amount of behavioral or performance variables. In the FCMS control is accomplished
through relatively few variables, thus allowing dynamic interaction among numerous
economic variables as occurs naturally in real-world markets. This follows the structure
of experimental simulation (Ward et a1. 1996).
The FCMS is designed to be played in specific trading periods called weeks.
Each week lasts between six and eight minutes. Throughout the trading period, market
information is provided on two different display bars. One display bar scrolls cash
market information (trading volume and high-low prices) which is analogous to current
market information available to fed cattle buyers and sellers from the USDA!Agricultural
Marketing Service (USDA/AMS). The other display bar scrolls futures market
information (trading volume and current prices for three futures market contracts) which
is analogous to information available from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Ward et at.
1996).
The three -to-five minute period following trading is an information-processing
period or "weekend" during which each team updates its showlist, calculates breakeven
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prices, and formulates marketing strategies. For each period, the FCMS software
provides an individual income statement for each team, as well as summary market
information for the preceding period. "This summary information also resembles that
available from USDAIAMS in the real-world fed cattle market" (Anderson et al. 1998).
Data generated from past sessions have been used to study marketing agreements (Ward
et a1. 1999a), price discovery (Ward et al. 1996), and information impacts on price
discovery (Anderson et al. 1998). Each study has been conducted in a similar format.
Experimental simulation guidelines were employed to provide real-world market
dynamics.
Data
Data for this research were generated from three separate semesters of the
Agricultural Economics Course 3990, the Fed Cattle Market Simulator. The class meets
in 90 minute sessions in the spring semesters at Oklahoma State University. Students are
generally upper-level agriculture majors from various fields.
The data collected for this study were transaction specific for each trade that
occurred throughout the time of the simulation. Data were collected from approximately
65-70 weeks of trading or 2,000-2,600 pens of cattle. Cattle are bought and sold in pens
of 100 head and are marketed by one of the eight feedlots to one of the four packers
(Dowty 1996). Cattle are available for trade at one of five different weight classes
ranging from 1100 to 1200 pounds. Cattle weights increase by 25 pounds after each
week of trading. However, due to low profit potential, animals are rarely traded at the
1100 pound level and any such trades were omitted for analysis purposes. Once the
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animals exceed 1200 pounds they are no longer available for trade, and are sold at a
significant loss within the computer program.
An overall summary description of the data used in this research can be found in
Table 2 and a summary of statistics is included in Table 3. Each data observation
consisted of one transaction that represented the trade of 100 head of cattle between one
feedlot and one meatpacking firm. Transaction specific data included: week traded,
bargaining power index, sale weight, total number of pens sold in that particular week.
showlist size, and boxed beef price. A sample of transaction specific variables can be
found in Appendix A.
Students experience the simulation from both the packer and feedlot perspective.
Throughout the simulation, participants are periodically rotated from one position to
another. Students do not stay with any particular feedlot or packer for an extended period
of time.
Results
The purpose of the model used in this research is to identify the effect of various
market conditions on bargaining power. Throughout the analysis 0 f bargaining power, all
results were reported from the feedlot perspective. Therefore, a negative sign associated
with any of the test variables indicates that feedlot bargaining power was negatively
affected by that variable; likewise the opposite is true for a positive sign. Thus, switching
the signs will change the interpretations to the packer's point of view. The bargaining
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power model illustrated the effects of such market conditions as weight, showlist size,
and weight and showlist interactions.
As shown in Table 4, the model continued several preliminary hypotheses, while
providing several other interesting findings that were somewhat unexpected. The R2 of
the model is 0.12. While this is a somewhat low r-squared value, many other factors
affect bargaining power such as exceptional bargainers and other conditions that contain
substantial statistical "noise" that varies between trading periods and transactions.
However, those conditions would generally not be correlated with the included
independent variables. Due to the real-world nature of the data, all variables were
necessarily not isolated as feedlots and packers constantly negotiate and seek better terms
of trade.
The Breusch-Pagan, Glejser, and Harvey tests for heteroskedasticity were used on
the three years of data and resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity. In order to alleviate the problem, the iterative program for the
correction of heteroskedasticity, as specified by Greene (1997), was employed. The
procedure uses an iterative process to estimate coefficients given multipicative
heteroskedaticity, consequently heteroskedaticity was corrected during the seventh
iteration of the process.
Results confirmed that showlist has an influential affect on bargaining power with
a coefficient of -0.17. The negative coefficient flows with real-world dynamics in that
showlist and bargaining power are inversely related. Additionally, weight characteristics,
as originally hypothesized, have a crucial affect on bargaining power. However, early
hypotheses proved to be different than the results yielded from testing. Originally,
20
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bargaining power was hypothesized to be positive for feedlots from 1125 pounds through
1150 pounds, peaking after 1125 pounds and then becoming increasingly negative
thereafter. However, an important result was found that revealed showlist and weight,
when interacted, have substantial effects on bargaining power. The weight/showlist
interaction isolates the effects of weight under different showlist levels. Under light
showlists feedlots maintain all bargaining power, whereas under normal and heavy
showlists feedlots maintain virtually no bargaining power. This is illustrated in Figure 1
through a three series representation of light, average, and heavy showlists for the weight
classes.
The first series shows that bargaining power under a light showlist maintains a
positive nature for feedlots throughout the entire weight range. Bargaining power
decreases slightly from 1125 to 1150 pounds (but stays positive), and then increases from
1150 pounds through 1200 pounds. The second series of results showed how bargaining
power was affected by weight when an average showlist was present. Bargaining power
was never positive for feedlots under the average showlist conditions. Increases were
noticed from the weight of 1125 through 1175 pounds, where it peaked but was not
largely negative. Thereafter, bargaining power decreased until the cattle reached 1200
pounds and were either sold at a loss, or bought by the computer. The third series
involves a large showlist. In this series, bargaining power was never in the favor of
feedlots. Bargaining power was negative from 1125 to 1200 pounds. Bargaining power
peaked at a weight of 1150 pounds during this time period, but abruptly decreased
thereafter.
2l
It is evident that showlist size has a substantial impact in determining who
possesses the most bargaining power. When showlist numbers are low, such as 90 pens
of cattle, it is difficult for processors to meet their demand quotas. Therefore, the
processors are willing to pay higher prices for animals. Consequently, feedlots have the
opportunity to sell animals at a premium. This accounts for the booms in feedlot profits
that are commonly encountered in both real life and in the classroom. When showlists
are around an average size, such as 122 pens of cattle, we think of the market as "being
balanced." However, balanced does not adequately represent the bargaining power
received by feedlots. During this time period feedlots have less bargaining power than
processors. They can simply strive to market their animals at a moderate weight before
bargaining power shifts increasingly to the processors. Much the same is true when the
showlist is big, such as 170 pens of cattle. The difference here in that situation is that
feedlots never have significant bargaining power. In other words, it is extremely difficult
(if not impossible) for feedlots to make a profit in this situation.
Implications for Marketing Systems
The information presented here should be of value to the fed cattle segment of the
beef industry. Answers to bargaining power questions based on market dynamics are
shown within the framework of this research. These are: 1) feedlots maintain the
majority of bargaining power under light showlist situations. 2) feedlots maintain little
bargaining power under normal and heavy showlist situations, and 3) analysis of
incoming cattle supplies can be a useful tool in predicting the future status of who
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controls bargaining power. Although the information provided does not reveal any
secrets to gaining higher prices for cattle across the board, it does show how a competent
manager could seek to maximize bargaining power and returns under different market
conditions.
Insight has been given as to when to sell animals in order to avoid a large loss as
well as when to maintain ownership of animals for extended periods of time in order to
achieve larger profits. Not surprisingly, this analysis has shown that feedlot managers
should not base their selling decisions exclusively on the weight ofanimals, but just as
importantly should consider the supply of animals in feedlots. Feedlots should seek to
maintain ownership of fed cattle as long as possible when the supply available to
processors is limited. This technique will generally result in the realization of overall
higher profits. Similarly, it is in the feedlots best interest to sell their cattle at moderate
weights to processors when the supply available is large. This will ensure that feedlots
receive the best price available, even if it means suffering a loss. Finally. when the
supply of feedlot animals is average it is in the best interest of feedlots to monitor sales
price trends as well as the incoming supply level in order to successfully obtain fair
prices. Average supply characteristics are statistically proven to be slightly in favor of
processors, but any significant change in market conditions is capable of skewing
bargaining power toward one side or the other. Therefore, it is extremely important to




Through the use of a newly employed experimental simulation model, the
estimation of bargaining power control in the beef industry was accomplished. Potential
beneficiaries of this study include feedlots and processors, as well as other entities
involved in the production and sales of perishable products. A statistical model has been
designed to identify market variables that affect bargaining power. From this model, it
was possible to illustrate how bargaining power shifts between feedlots and processors
under varying market conditions (primarily weight and supply). The importance of
monitoring such a shift is that the side controlling more bargaining power has a greater
profit potential.
It is essential to understand that weight, although not as dominating as previously
suspected, has a substantial affect on bargaining power. Additionally, showlist size plays
a detennining role in bargaining power. It would be improper to state that one factor is
dominant over the other, rather it is necessary for the two variables to be used in
association with one another to derive a true illustration of bargaining power.
Further study could be focused on feedlot and processor dynamics. This type of
study would monitor whether or not the entity in control of bargaining power is utilizing
it in such a way as to achieve the highest possible profit. This infonnation would be
particularly useful to feedlots due to the fact that the majority of the time they have less
bargaining power. An observation is that feedlots sell animals too cheap in the FCMS
even when they control bargaining power. It is hypothesized that this also occurs in
industry. This can be attributed to the belief that they are content with making a
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moderate profit, when in actuality they could make a tremendous profit. A major
drawback, however, is obtaining pertinent infonnation from the industry for testing
purposes. However, proven results in this area could potentially improve long-run
feedlot profits.
Additional exploration resulting from this study could be in the area of price
discovery and price determination. Previous research in agricultural economics has not
clearly differentiated between the two (Ward 1997). However, factors such as supply and
demand that affect bargaining power also affect price. This is represented through th~
creation of the showlist and weight interaction variables used in this research whose
results parallel the dynamics of price discovery. Further research could clearly illustrate
the characteristics defined by price discovery and those defined by price determination.
The outcome should be a clear differentiation between the two.
One major limitation to the study was the inability to isolate embedded factors
that affect bargaining power. Further detailed study could be employed to test for other
significant factors that affect it. This type of analysis could include tracking individual
participants under all market conditions to study whether one person bargains more
effectively than another. It is clear that extended planning and precise experimental
structure is needed for this to be accomplished, largely due to the effort required to keep
records on each participant for the duration of the simulation.
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BPI -0.15
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1175 Ib cattle 0.27
1200 Ib caltle 0.13
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Showlist Squared 5.8 X 10-4*
(8.46)
Year 1 (1995) -0.24*
(-3.75)
Year 2 (1996) 0.28*
(3.88)
Number of Observations 7249
a Represents t-statistics, • denotes significance at the 10% level.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE OF TRANSACTION SPECIFIC
VARIABLES ACCORDING TO YEAR
WEEK BPI 1125 1150 1175 1200 Shwl·1125 Shwl·1150 Shwl· 1175 Shwl· 1200 Showlist Showlise 1994 1995 1996
30 -3025 1 0 0 0 123 0 0 0 123 15129 1 0 0
71 -0205 1 0 0 0 123 0 0 0 123 15129 1 0 0
BO -0270 0 1 0 0 0 109 0 0 109 11BB1 1 0 0
!..J
W
30 2020 0 1 0 0 0 111 0 0 111 12321 0 1 0
56 -1.265 0 0 1 0 0 0 125 0 125 15625 0 1 0
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CONTRACTING IN THE BEEF INDUSTRY
Abstract
Recent developments within the fed cattle segment of the beef industry have led
to structural changes in the market. Among these changes is an increase in the use of
contractual agreements between feedlots and meat processors. Contractual arrangements
can benefit both feedlots and processors by considerably reducing price and production
risks. However, the effect of these arrangements on overall price and returns to major
segments in the industry has been a source of substantial controversy. As contracting
levels increase within a market, a portion ofthe total available supply is delegated to
those agreements. This portion of the supply is referred to as "captive supply." As
captive supply increases, the portion of the supply available for sale in the cash market
decreases. This phenomena is known as a "thin market. '" A common contention is that
cash price is driven below normal levels and experiences increased volatility as captive




CONTRACTING IN THE BEEF INDUSTRY
Introduction
A strong trend of contracting has overtaken many areas of production agriculture.
Since 1960, contracting has been a growing part of agriculture and in 1993 accounted for
about $47 billion (32 percent) of U.S. agricultural production (USDA 1996). Contractual
agreements are common place in many industries such as broilers, turkeys, eggs, milk,
fruit, and vegetables.
Cattle marketing has similarly seen increased levels of contracting, vertical
integration, and strategic alliances. These arrangements develop fOTITIS of "captive
supply" for packers and, as they increase in the industry as a common vertical exchange
relationship, they increasingly lead to what is commonly called a "thin" cash market.
There have been strong ongoing concerns about the impact of this change on pricing
dynamics (Hayenga 1979). Some have argued that these changes will result in lower
prices and returns to farmers (Elam 1992). Another common theoretical expectation is
that the price will become increasingly volatile as a market becomes increasingly thin
(Williamson 1979). These changes and potential effects are a source of substantial
controversy (Hayenga 1979; Elam 1992; Williamson 1979).
A key need is for research to study the effect of contracting on markets. Study of
the impact of contracting presents substantial difficulties. The markets in question are
slowly changing in structure by implementing non-price procurement methods such as






series study. However, a research design where contracting levels can be controlled to
study the effects at different levels can be developed Using experimental economics. In
this type of approach, varying levels of contracting can be studied to identify their impact
on market price levels and price volatility due to thin markets.
This study will focus on the effects contracting has on the cash market price
received for beef cattle. Controlled changes in contracting levels will be used to examine
the effect of contracting levels on cash prices. Special interest is devoted to examining
whether cash price is forced below or above average in periods of high contracting.
Additionally. volatility issues will be addressed to identify whether increased levels of
contracting cause increased amounts of rapid price adjustments in the cash market.
Literature Review
This study addresses the effects of captive supply and thin markets (caused from
contracting) on cash market prices. Several areas of study have focused on these effects,
but previous research has not been able to isolate the effects of increasingly thin markets
from other changes in supply and demand. Early cash price studies addressed price
changes from a market structure standpoint and were then used as a building block for
later studies. The infonnation covered here begins with early studies of market structure
and then moves into later research that is specific to captive supply and thin markets.
Reviewing previous research on captive supply and price discovery will link this research
to earlier work as well as utilize knowledge in the areas of price discovery, the effects of





Price discovery within the fed cattle industry is based upon market. dynamics. In
recent history price discovery has commonly been studied from an industrial organization
theory approach. This is the belief that buyers and sellers directly affect price fonnation
through "shocking" or changing the market conditions. In the beef industry, two specific
forms of price discovery were studied using this theoretical approach, both of which were
based upon a shock to the marketing system. This theory is relevant to the current work
because it has been the building block upon which all subsequent research has developed.
The first investigation examines the effects on price when a major buyer exits the
market through slaughter plant closings (Love and Shuffett 1965; Ward 1983; Hayenga.
Dieter, and Montoya 1986). Prices declined in two of the three studies (Love and
Shuffett 1965; Ward 1983), while the third study revealed no immediate price decline in
relation to comparison markets (Hayenga, Dieter, and Montoya 1986).
The second set of studies focuses on the effects of price when buyers enter the
market through a change in marketing method (Ward 1984; Rhodus, Baldwin. and
Henderson 1989; Bailey and Peterson 1991) or plant opening (Hayenga, Dieter, and
Montoya 1986). In all four cases price increased as a result of more buyers. Ward et al.
(1999) notes that all price effects in the previous studies are due to sudden shifts in
market conditions and structural behavior changes.
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Effects ofContracting
A new trend for managing vertical exchange relationships which may have price
impacts, has become increasingly common. This mechanism involves non-cash
procurement which results in a certain amount of the product supply being under contract
or other managed relationships. The supply that is involved in this process is typically
known as "captive" supply. This results in the beef industry when a feedlot enters into a
contract with a packer. Captive supply is traditionally created through the use of one of
three procurement methods: 1) Exclusive Marketing Agreements, 2) Packer Feeding, or
3) Forward Contracting. In each case cattle are purchased several weeks prior to
slaughter and before animals are sold in the cash market (Ward et al. 1999). Once such
an agreement has been formed, supply contracts are established in which the cattle feeder
agrees to market a specified number of cattle in a specific period to a given buyer (Ward
et al. 1998). Prior research in this area has focused on cash market price effects due to
captive supply.
A significant portion of contract utilization can be attributed to the need for more
uniform goods. In open market settings, goods often vary drasticall y in size, shape.
appearance, weight, quantity, timeliness, and quality. Further, it can become expensive
to get specific quality attributes for certain products. However, with the use of
contracting, a more exact product specification can be achieved. In other words.
members of a contract agreement can agree on the characteristics above, as well as a
delivery date and price. This is a key factor that has increased the use of contracting
within the poultry and swine industries. Both industries are similarly related in that
39
-
production takes place in an extremely controlled, as well as confmed environment. The
result is that entrepreneurs of each industry produce a uniform product that is later sold
(under contract) to a major wholesaler or other contractual buyers.
An increase in the use of contracting can also be attributed to the dependability of
income that is received from performing a service or producing a commodity. Contracts
can be established to cover extended periods of time such as months or years. This type
of agreement benefits many producers because it ensures a stable income into an area that
is typically not well diversified (USDA 1996). The result is a reduction of income risk
on behalf of producers and a secure purchase price for processors.
Contracting has also become an important part of business due to a need for
tighter vertical coordination. One means of improving vertical coordination is for a
central or coordinating body to establish contracts with various entities that produce all or
part of a product. The contracts typically specify that a certain amount of goods will be
produced and available (at a pre-determined date) for the coordinating body.
Consequently, the producing bodies receive compensation for their activities as long as
all contract specifications are met.
Anderson et al. (1998b) notes that firms understand the importance of vertical
coordination and further acknowledges that studies have expanded to include non-price
coordination methods while focusing on vertical coordination. For example. Frank and
Henderson note that "asset specificity" is often a strong incentive for vertical
coordination. Asset specificity describes goods or components that are generally
unmarketable or difficult to market once purchased or created, however playa major role









specificity into three categories: nonspecific, mixed, and idiosyncratic. Nonspecific
assets, or investments as described by Anderson et al. (1998b) and Williamson, can be
used in many different ways, whereas idiosyncratic investments have a specific use. As
expected, mixed asset situations exist between the previous two extremes mentioned
above. Williamson believes that contracting exists primarily between parties when th~
asset involved is of a mixed nature, whereas vertical integration (complete ownership)
becomes more prevalent when assets are idiosyncratic. Thus, vertical coordination has
become prevalent in the beef industry and led to an increase in contractual agreements
which have boosted the amount of captive supply.
Research measuring the effects of captive supply has studied the effects of price
in relation to different levels of captive supply. Elam found that increasing levels of
captive supply drove cattle transaction prices down in Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and
Texas over the period of October 1988 to May 1991. Hayenga and O'Brien compared
weekly average feeder prices for the same states with other reported market prices from
October 1988 to December 1989. Overall research found that the impact of captive
supply on price was mixed. Some research found cash price to be higher and others found
it to be lower, but mostly insignificant. A third study also found a negative relationship
between fed cattle captive supply shipments and cash market transaction prices between
May and November 1990 in Kansas (Schroeder 1993). Finally, Ward, Koontz, and
Schroeder (1998) estimated impacts from captive supply on cash transaction prices across
the United States. In general, increased levels of captive supply yielded lower cash









Current records show that in 1997 16% of the fed cattle traded were sold under
contract and the trend likely shows a significant increase in the future (USDA 1999).
Anderson et al. (1998a), in a study citing the need for public infonnation in relation to
contracting, predicts that forward contracting in the fed cattle industry will continue to
grow in the future. Ward (1998) agrees by noting that the beef industry faces larger
biological differences and longer production delays than the pork and poultry industries
in addition to cattle requiring vast amounts of space which makes production land-
intensive.
Price Volatility
Price volatility is a concern associated with high levels of contracting. Through
monitoring the effects of contracting, it is possible to note any fluctuations or volatile
characteristics in cash prices that may occur due to captive supply situations brought on
by contracting. Previous research leads to the assumption that as the cash market supply
becomes thin, the cash price is capable of being drastically affected (Hayenga 1978). As
market conditions change, the cash price seeks to restore market equilibrium. Thus. price
frequently fluctuates in an attempt to restore the equilibrium (Ward 1997).
Previous research dealing with pricing issues in this area have largely been in
relation to general captive supply and thin market situations. The emphasis of such
research has been to conceptualize the effects of thinning supplies on price. Both captive
supplies and thin markets cause changes in market structure. A major change occurs in
the method of price discovery. Because these conditions lead to markets in which buyer-








to experience more variability in price (Jesse 1980). Further, research has also revealed
that cash values may not be representative of aggregate supply and demand conditions
due to the effects of thinly traded markets (Raikes 1978; Williamson 1979).
Price volatility is an issue that bas lacked extensive study, particularly in relation
to contractual agreements. A large factor contributing to the lack of study is an inability
to obtain industry pricing literature. Extended pricing data is not available because of the
cost associated with collecting such information. Further, information that could
potentially be beneficial is often internalized within large agribusiness firms and is not
available for public use.
Summary
The research presented here has focused on three areas. First, early studies
conceptualized the factors that cause changes in market dynamics. These studies were
largely based on industrial organization theory. Information from these research areas
were then used as a stepping stone in a trend toward examining the effects of changing
market conditions. Common areas of study have been captive supply and thin markets
where captive supplies were often found to impact cash prices negatively. The third
research area deals with the causes and effects of price volatility. This research indicated
that increasingly "thin" markets should lead to increased price volatility and non-
supply/demand representative prices. It is also important to note that previous research









Experimental economics is a fonn of modeling that is designed to represent the
conditions that exist in real world markets. Several criteria govern the fonnation of an
experimental research study. These factors include the ability of the study to be
replicated, an inherent motivation force that stimulates participants interest in the
activity at hand, and the ability for choices to be made without bias.
A particular fonn of experimental economics is commonly known as
experimental simulation. Experimental simulation maintains many of the qualities
possessed by experimental economics, yet in a refined manner. Experimental simulation
is similar to experimental economics in the three factors described above. However, it is
common for experimental simulation to be free from most inhibitors. In other words,
restraints are not placed on the majority of the variables for the purpose of testing, while
experimental economics may have restraints placed on multiple variables (Friedman and
Sunder 1994). Thus, the distinguishing factor is that experimental simulation allows for
the creation of a more life-like market.
The nature ofthe Fed Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS) employed at Oklahoma
State University resembles a design governed by experimental simulation characteristics.
This allows for a free flow of trading activity that would naturally occur in an open
market. Accordingly, the simulator is also capable of controlling specific aspects of the
simulated market in order to complete related market studies. Therefore, it was used to
create the data for this study.
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The Fed Cattle Market Simulator was used to create an atmosphere analogous to
that which exists between feedlots and packing companies. The FCMS allows players to
act out the part of both packers and feeders through trading pens of cattle. The cattle are
produced by feedlots and then sold to packers. It is the job of both the feedlots and the
packers to mathematically calculate the breakeven prices that must be received in order to
achieve profits or avoid losses that could occur through trading. Each side seeks to
optimize the profit they are capable of receiving from cattle sales.
The FCMS is played in specific trading periods that last between seven and eight
minutes. Each trading period is tenned a week. At the end of each trading week. there is
a five to ten minute information session in which participants monitor prices and analyze
supply and demand conditions that are analogous to that available from the USDA!AMS
(Anderson et al. 1998a).
Once play begins, feedlots are given a certain amount of cattle in which they have
to market to the packers. Animals within the game may be sold through the us of an
open cash market, marketing agreement, or forward contract. It is the responsibility of
the feedlots and processors to bargain with one another in such a way as to arrive at a
reasonable sales price for both parties.
In past studies, researchers have analyzed the effects of public information
(Anderson, et aI., 1998a), price discovery (Ward. et aI., 1996a). as well as non-price
vertical coordination in the fed cattle market (Anderson, et al.. 1998b). Since this
evaluation will involve analysis of cash price and volatility, the objective of this study is
to estimate the extent to which increasing levels of contracting affect cash market prices.
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Data
Data for this research, as stated, were generated from the FCMS. The class meets
in the spring semester and generally consists of upper-level agricultural majors. The data
set was generated from a one semester controlled study ofcontracting levels in the spring
of 1999 and then compared with pricing results of three previous years (1994, 1995, and
1996).
Students were allowed to freely trade animals for the first simulated thirteen
weeks of the study in order to become familiar with the interaction process required to be
successful. At the end of this introduction session, students were informed by the
administrators of the study that selected levels of contracting were going to gradually be
implemented into the simulation. Before each trading period, feedlots were instructed
how many cattle were to be contracted to predetennined processors. (Additionally, teams
were also allowed to contract on their own as long as the mandatory contracting levels
were fulfilled).
The research plan consisted of six discrete contracting levels: 1) 0%. 2) 25%, 3)
50%,4) 62%, 5) 75%, and 6) 87%. Each level of contracting was used once for eight
weeks before rotating upward to the next consecutive level. Table] indicates weeks for
each contracting level and Table 2 contains a summary of statistics of the data.
Contract prices were determined from the previous week's cash price.
Modifications were made to the contract price if either the packer or feeder involved in a
contractual agreement lost money the week before. In order to make appropriate
adjustments, both packers and feeders were required to indicate if they lost or made
money. If both entities were making or losing money, then no adjustment was made.
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However, if one entity was making money and the other losing money, then a $0.50 price
adjustment was made for the packer or feeder that was losing money. Further, in all
cases, packers and feeders were not allowed to share profit and loss statements. Finally.
in the event of disputes over the truthfulness of prices from previous weeks, the
administrators of the experiment had the right to penalize the offending party up to $2.00
at their discretion.
The testing period consisted of 58 simulated weeks in which contracting was
monitored. All contracts were selected at random in order to bypass favoritism between
participants. Additionally, students involved were frequently rotated so that all players
had the opportunity to experience trade as both feedlot and processing managers.
Conceptual Framework
Understanding market structure is essential in order to conceptualize the effects of
changing characteristics within a market. Markets typically evolve over time. Within the
evolution, structural behavioral changes occur. In this case the change is an increased use
of contracting. Therefore, through a common understanding of structural dynamics, such
as price determination, the effects of contracting can be isolated.
Price is determined through the dynamic interaction of supply and demand.
Product supply within a given market is used to fill consumer demand. Consequently.
buyers and sellers agree to terms in which the product will be sold. Therefore. during the
sales negotiation of a product a transaction price is agreed upon. Over the course of
multiple transactions, buyers will generally seek to find suppliers that are willing to sell
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their products at the lowest price possible. Likewise, suppliers will generally seek out
buyers who will purchase their products at the highest price. Throughout repetition of
this process, an equilibrium (or common) market price evolves. However, when
imposing characteristics such as contracting are integrated into the market. thin market
characteristics evolve. These characteristics may impact cash price levels and volatility.
This can largely be attributed to the effect of captive supply which allows for only a small
amount of bargaining to exist within the cash market. Therefore, the market often suffers
from under-represented cash prices because of a lack of buyers and sellers needed to
establish a pertinent price. Further, this can lead to the possibility of delayed price effects
in the cash market. Delayed effects occur when the cash price maintains high (low)
levels for extended periods of time when it should be adjusting to current market
conditions. This potentially leads to abrupt shifts in the cash price in an effort to
reestablish the equilibrium price.
In the beef industry, feedlots and processors bargain and negotiate in order to
establish transaction prices. Previous transaction specific research dealing Vv'ith the
impacts of captive supplies on fed cattle prices have established both supply and demand
variables as well as transaction specific infonnation (Ward et a1. 1998). Previous
research can be conceptualized by the following general model:
(I ) Price = f(Supply/Demand, Transaction Specific Characteristics).
However, this study focuses on week-to-week market changes so the use of transaction
specific information is not applicable.
Supply and demand in this case can be represented by showlist size (the number
of animals available for sale) and boxed beef price (the price in which wholesale cuts of
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meat are sold), respectively. These characteristics parallel those used by Anderson et al.
(1998a) and Ward et al. (1998, 1999). The relationship can be expressed by:
(2) P = f(BBP, SHWL),
where BBP is boxed beef price and SHWL is showlist.
The effects of contracting can be captured through adding an additional variable
that is representative of the contracting level that is utilized during the applicable week of
study. The use of contracting causes a fonn of captive supply as well as leads to a thin
cash market. The contracting variable is important because it indicates the amount of th~
market which is contracted and hence is not negotiated.
The effects of contracting on cash price will be tested through the use of the
controlled data produced from one semester of the FCMS. The data yields prices realized
in the cash market as contracting levels are varied in a controlled manner. These prices
will then be compared to three previous years of data that yield cash market prices when
contracting was either non-existent or done voluntarily only. The comparisons will be
used to identify the effects on cash price returns and serve as an agent to monitor price
volatility. Cash prices received under contract will be tested against cash prices received
under no contract in order to determine if there is a significant difference between the
two.
Through the graphical depiction (Figure 1), which represents the pricing data
used, it is apparent that different prices are present under contractual conditions than
under non-contractual conditions. At the 0% contracting level, prices are very similar
indicating that similar underlying pricing dynamics exist for all four years. However, at
the 25% contracting level, 1999 cash prices begin to consistently deviate from the other
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years, sometimes dramatically. Further, as contracting levels increase, the cash price
begins to deviate in a greater amount.
The fact that pricing dynamics change is not surprising. However, it is surprising
to see that cash prices associated with contracts (1999) rose above previous years' prices
(1994, 1995, and 1996) in certain situations. This seems to refute a common
conventional argument that increasing levels of contracting lead to lower cash market
pnces.
The effects of contracting will be evaluated by testing three hypotheses. Each
hypothesis will utilize different approaches to study thin market effects. The hypotheses
are: 1) Increased levels ofcontracting cause lower average cash prices, 2) Increased
levels of contracting cause an "enhanced supply effect", and 3) Increased levels of
contracting cause cash prices to become increasingly volatile.
Hypothesis 1
It is hypothesized that the cash market price for fed cattle is reduced by increased
levels of contracting. A common argument in many studies is that as captive supply
increases, the cash market price declines (ELam 1992; Schroeder et al. 1993). In this
examination the contention that increasing levels of contracting cause low cash prices
will be tested.
Captive supply may have notable effects on general supply and demand
conditions because it causes a thin cash market. In this situation captive supply reduces
the number of available (non-purchased or non-committed) fed cattle in short-tenn
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supply. This occurs because animals are already contracted to specific individuals,
therefore reducing the number of animals available for sale in the cash market.
Additionally, packers will purchase fewer animals from the open market because their
demands have been partially met through captive supply cattle deliveries. As a result. the
short-term demand curve shifts to the left and a new supply/demand equilibrium is
established.
In order to evaluate the effects of contracting on cash market price it is necessary
to include the factors that have an affect on overall price formation as well as contracting
levels. As discussed earlier, the variables that are effective at describing supply and
demand conditions are showlist size and boxed beef price. With the addition of a
contracting variable this results in the following regression model:
(3) PI = a. + BBP. + SHWL\ + Pereont. + El'
where PI = price. a. = intercept value for zero percent contracting, BBPt = Boxed Beef
Price, SHWLt = Showlist Size, PerContt = percent contracting. and the subscript t refers
to the trading week. The contracting percentage is used as a test variable in order to
analyze whether it has a significant affect on price detennination as contracting levels
Increase.
The results of the model are presented in Table 3. First order auto-correlation was
discovered and corrected for using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure for correction of auto-
correlation as employed by the Statistical Analysis System (SAS). Additionally,
multiplicative heteroskedasticity was found using the Breusch-Pagan, Glejser, and
Harvey tests for heteroskedasticity, but was not believed to skew the results and therefore
not corrected for. The model proved to have strong explanatory power and revealed an
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R2 ofO.90. Etu;h ofthe parameter estimates is highly significant. Most int r stingly, the
contracting coefticient is negative which is consistent with the common argwnent that
high levels of contracting lead to low cash prices. This result may be consistent with
earlier research, but the graphical illustration of cash market. prices (Figure I) suggests
that the previous regression results may not fully reflect the underlying price dynamics.
As shown from the graph, cash price actual y exec. ds normal levels in many situations.
This certainly seems to contradict the evidence above.
the analysis of the graphical illustration of price behavior was further
strengthened through the use of a t-test (presented in Table 4) to detennine if any of the
pricing data deviated significantly between the years. This continned that mean prices
for data comprising 1994, 1995, and 1996 were not statistically significantly different.
whereas the mean prices for 1999 were statistically different in four of the six trading
periods. Further, three of the four occurred during the highest levels of contracting.
Prices representing 1999 became significantly different once contracting was
implemented. The only deviation from this pattern occurred at the 50% contracting level
where the price crossed the prices associated with the other years. Most importantly,
price was not only significantly lower than previous cash prices. but also significantly
higher than the norm.
Thus, this result seems to suggest that high prices are higher than the nonn with
small supply levels and low prices are lower than the nonn with large supply level.s.
Under increased contracting levels this would indicate that supply has a more dramatic
affect on cash market prices. This indicates that the cash market overreacts when the
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market as a whole experiences extreme supplies (either high or low) along with high
levels of contracting.
The results from the regression analysis supported conventional theory in that
increasing levels of contracting lead to lower cash prices. However the qualitative
results yielded from the graphical depiction of cash prices as well as the statistical test
results suggest that contracting has mixed effects on cash price.
Hypothesis 2
The previous results showed that contracting seemed to have varied or
inconsistent effects on the cash price. This suggests that under certain conditions,
contracting can cause cash prices to rise above nonnal, while at other times it can cause
cash prices to dip below nonna!. Similarly, it might also be reasonable to expect an
enhanced supply effect on cash price as contracting levels increase. As contracting
increases, the number of buyers and sellers bargaining in the cash market declines.
Therefore, the competition for available supply is decreased in the cash market and cash
price declines. Further, as both contracting levels and overall supply levels increase, the
cash market suffers even more. Controversly, if high levels of contracting are associated
with low overall supply conditions, the competition for products in the cash market will
be great, resulting in higher cash prices. Therefore, it is logical to detennine that as
contracting levels increase, the marginal impact of supply increases.
This suggests that there may be different relationships between supply and price
than when contracting is not present. An increase in supply would result in a lowering of
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the cash price. However, with increased amounts of contracting, the cash price is not
only lowered because of supply, but it also suffers the effects of buyers fulfilling all or
part of their demand requirements through contractual obligations. Therefore cash price
is driven down further because of the effects ofcontracting. This suggests the effect is
negative. However, the same principle can hold for periods of low supply in that prices
are pushed higher. This could be termed the "enhanced supply effect" where essentially
highs get higher and lows get lower in the cash market.
This hypothesis can be tested through modifying Equation 3 to include a variable
that represents the interaction of contracting and showlist. This theory can be tested
through the empirical equation:
(4) Pt = 0.\ + SSP\ + SHWLt + PerContt + ShwlCont + Eh
where Ph at, SSPt, SHWLt, PerCont\, and t are unchanged, and ShwlConl = SHWLt •
PerCont.
The statistical results ofthis regression are shown in Table 5. The parameter sign
of boxed beef remains unchanged, however the parameter sign for contracting became
positive but was not substantially significantly different from zero, indicating that it did
not have either a positive or negative affect on cash price. Further, the showlist variable
became insignificant while the showlist-contracting interaction variable is significant.
indicating that it has an affect on cash price.
The R2 of this regression analysis is 0.91, which indicates slightly broader
explanatory power than Equation 3. First order auto-correlation was detected and
corrected for using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure in SAS. Multiplicative
Heteroskedasticity was also found using the Sreusch-Pagan, Glejser, and Harvey tests for
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heteroskedasticity but not corrected for because it is not believed to affect the regression
results.
The results of this experimental model suggest that the showlist-contracting
interaction variable yields results that have previously not been found. This variable
indicates that contracting is capable of enhancing the effect of supply on cash price and
further shows that cash price can be both negatively and positively affected depending on
the supply situation.
Consistency with earlier studies has been exemplified through observations from
industries with high levels of contracting. One example is the national pork industry
which has been marked by high levels of contracting over the past few years. The pork
industry has experienced the lowest sustained prices in recent history with high
oversupply, which would be consistent with the "enhanced supply effect" found in this
experiment.
Hypothesis 3
Effects observed from increased contracting levels imply that cash prices could
become more volatile as suggested by theory (Raikes 1978). Volatility issues studied in
this context refer to abrupt and sudden changes in cash prices due to extensive
contracting which leads to an increasingly thin market. Through observing the effects of
the controlled levels of contracting used in this research, it is possible to study price
volatility on a week to week basis as well as to see whether the cash market is subject to
large overall price adjustments. The goal of this study is to make an initial observation
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about the mechanics of price volatility, rather than create in depth research. The
infonnation gained from this study should be used to identify the initial effects of
contracting on volatility and create a basis in which further research can be accomplished.
Therefore, the third hypothesis is that cash price begins to incorporate volatile
characteristics as contracting levels increase.
Cash price volatility can be monitored through the graphical illustration presented
in Figure 2. It is important to note the strong resemblance in price change characteristics
between 1994, 1995, and 1996. The change in the 1999 cash price closely follows the
changes of the other three years (1994, 1995, and 1996) during periods of no contracting.
However, with the advent of contracting, the cash price begins to experience periods of
vary calm price changes followed by periods of rapid and drastic adjustments. Price
changes that occur between weeks 43 and 50 are mild, whereas price changes between
weeks 70 and 76 are extremely erratic. Another interesting pattern appears between
weeks 51 and 60. It appears that the cash price experiences changes that are inconsistent
with the other three years. In fact, the changes in price appear to be greater and then
smaller than the other years.
These patterns can be studied further through the examination of Table 6.
Between weeks 35 and 42, the changes in 1999 cash price are not significantly different
than those for 1994, 1995, and 1996. However, between weeks 43 and 75 the price
change is significantly different than the previous years. Even more interesting is the fact
that between the weeks of 43-50 and 59-66 the cash price for 1999 had less price change
than the other years. Moreover, the statistical results in Table 6 are consistent with the
results presented in Figure 2.
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It can be noted from the statistical and graphical results presented above that cash
price volatility is affected by increasing contract levels. Cash price changes for 1999
were found to be significantly different from the changes for 1994, 1995, and 1996.
Interestingly, the changes for 1999 were not only different in higher volatility, but also in
lower volatility. Further, as the contracting levels increased variability in cash price
changes seemed to increase, but not in a linear fashion.
Market Implications
The results of this study may be of interest to all parties involved in cattle trade
and negotiations. Finns within the fed cattle segment of the beef industry that rely
heavily on non-cash procurement methods for cattle should be especially interested in
this research. Results of this study identified three major characteristics associated with
contracting. They are: 1) Cash market prices are affected both positively and negativ ly
by increasing levels of contracting, 2) Increasing levels of contracting cause an
"enhanced supply effect" on cash market prices, and 3) Increasing levels of contracting
lead to the potential for sudden large swings within cash market prices.
Some previous research found that cash market prices maintained an inverse
relationship with increasing levels of contracting. However, through the use of
regression analysis, statistical testing, graphical illustration, and replicable data sets, it
has been shown that increasing levels of contracting can push cash prices above normal
levels.
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Producers and processors may also find useful information in test results that
reveal cash market price is drastically affected by a combination of contracting level and
supply (showlist). Research revealed that in periods of high (low) supply and high levels
of contracting, the cash market price is dramatically lower (higher) than in average
conditions. These situations should be monitored on a continual basis. Through doing
this, producers and processors will have both an idea of expected contract agreements
(monetary and quantity) as well as what price levels to expect in the cash market.
Finally, it is also useful to know that increased levels of contracting have the
potential to cause variability in cash price. Systematic monitoring of contracting levels
can reduce some price risk associated with filling demand quotas through the cash
market. For example, if a general increase in overall contract levels is noted within the
industry, it could be in a processor's best interest to implement more contracting
agreements in order to eliminate the possibility of making large purchases in a volatile
cash market.
The infonnation presented here .can be used to analyze potential effects in the
marketplace. Producers and processors can utilize this material to heighten their
awareness of price risks associated with substantial contracting levels, thus allowing them
to plan appropriately.
Conclusion
This study has provided important insights into the effects of captive supply with
a focus on contracting. The central issue has been to estimate the effects of contracting
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on cash market prices. Results obtained from this research indicate that contracting has
mixed impacts on cash prices, depending on supply situations. These results were
different from earlier research and were only made possible through the use of
experimental economics. The specific nature and length of data on contracting is unique
to this study.
It has been identified from this study that price can be above or below average
when increased levels of contracting are present, depending on supply levels. It has also
been shown that cash market prices observed during high levels of contracting experience
an "enhanced supply effect." This causes cash prices to experience "higher highs" and
"lower lows." Additionally, cash price variability seemed to increase as contracting
increased, but not in a linear fashion.
Further research in this area might be achieved through the use of the "Bubble
Theory" to test dynamic adjustments and the probability of adjustments to underlying
market dynamics (Behzad 1989; Topol 1991). This can be justified by the premise that
price continuously increases (decreases) until it reaches a certain point and then decreases
(increases) dramatically in an effort to adjust. As a result, the outcome is typically a
significant over-adjustment. Thus, it is logical to deduce that contracting may affect
efficient price discovery.
Research interests might also focus on volatility issues. lnfonnation presented
here suggests that, in the presence of contracting, cash prices experience extremely
volatile periods followed by calm periods. This infonnation could potentially be
beneficial for new, effective risk management approaches when contracting has a major
influence on market dynamics.
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Related research can also be achieved through the study of price behavior within
the FCMS. Through graphical illustration, it became apparent that pricing characteristics
are extremely closely related between the three years (1994, 1995, and 1996) of non-
mandatory contracting. Study in this area could focus on price patterns and the
illustration of price as it occurred in all semesters since the implementation of the FCMS.
A further research area would be to compare the results of th.is research with those
gained from research in another industry. This would allow for the comparison of
consistency within test results. Additionally, this research could identify differences and
similarities in the effects of contracting on cash price behavior that are experienced
between unrelated markets.
This research could further be improved through the use of another semester of
mandatory contracting. Further results could therefore be compared for consistency with
those gained in this paper. Similarly, it could potentially be beneficial to compare profit
summaries between highly contracted feedlots and processors and lightly contracted
feedlots and processors. This can be done for a given period of time in the same
semester. The outcome should reveal whether one group benefits more than the other
from contracting.
This research has analyzed the effects of contracting on cash prices. The use of
experimental simulation allowed for the creation of data that were used to estimate
characteristics of contracting that were previously unknown. The results obtained
suggest that future research in this area could be beneficial because of the growing use of
contracting in many production enterprises.
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1Controlled contracting began in week 34. Prior transactions
represented a training period for simulation participants.
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Cash Price Regression Analysis with Contracting Percentage
Variable
Constant


















Mean Price and Test for Significant Differences
=============,;,;fo;.;r..;1;.;;;9;;,9~4'b1,;,;;9;.;;;9;,;;;5,b'1996, and 1999 with 1999 Contract Level
YEAR 35-42 43-50
CONTRACTING WEEK
























Contractin Percent 0% 25% 50% 62% 75% 67%
1999 74.3 70.3· 784 65.0· 86.1· 69.4·
Showlist' High Low Low Average Average
Showlise 138 128 100 91 116 116
• Denotes a significant difference from all others at the 10% level.
, Showfisl size as compared 10 average s.howlisl of 115-122.
2 Average showlisl size for each contracting percenlage.
TABLE 5
Cash Price Regression Analysis with Contracting Interaction
Variable
Constant





















Mean Week·to·Week Price Change and Test for Significant
Differences for 1994,1996,1996, and 1999 with 1999 Contract Level
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* Denotes a significant difference from all others at the 10% level.
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